The Current Military Picture
The front lines in Sudan's war have shifted through the course of the conflict without producing the decisive breakthrough that either side has sought. The Rapid Support Forces, the RSF led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo known as Hemedti, moved swiftly in the early months of the war to seize large portions of Khartoum, including most of Omdurman, and to consolidate control over most of Darfur outside El Fasher, which remains the only major Darfuri city not under RSF control. The Sudanese Armed Forces, the SAF, retained control of Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast, which has served as the government's operating base, and maintained positions in parts of the north, the east, and in Khartoum proper, including the military headquarters area.
The SAF's response to the RSF's early territorial gains has relied heavily on air power. SAF aircraft have conducted extensive bombing campaigns against RSF positions in Khartoum and in Darfur, including strikes that have hit civilian infrastructure, markets, hospitals, and residential areas. The bombing has caused substantial civilian casualties and has been condemned by international human rights organisations, though without producing the kind of sustained international pressure that would constrain SAF operations. The RSF has no air force but has used drones, including apparently Iranian-supplied systems, for reconnaissance and some strike missions.
El Fasher in North Darfur has been under RSF siege and attack for an extended period and represents one of the most critical humanitarian pressure points in the entire conflict. The city, which hosts hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people from earlier rounds of Darfur conflict as well as those displaced by the current war, has been cut off from supply lines and subjected to sustained RSF assault. The SAF garrison there has held, but the human cost of the siege has been severe, and international warnings of potential mass atrocities if the city falls have been persistent.
The Humanitarian Catastrophe
Sudan's humanitarian crisis in 2026 is among the worst in the world by any measure. More than 11 million people have been internally displaced within Sudan, and over 3 million have fled to neighbouring countries, primarily Egypt, Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic, placing enormous strain on those countries' own resources and refugee systems. The displacement figure exceeds that of Ukraine at the peak of the 2022 Russian invasion and makes Sudan's internal displacement the largest single crisis of its kind on earth.
Food insecurity is acute across a large part of the country. Famine has been declared in at least one area of North Darfur, and famine conditions are present or imminent in several others. The combination of conflict, displacement, disrupted agricultural production, destroyed markets, and blocked humanitarian access has created food emergencies that affect tens of millions of people. The Sudan conflict is generating food insecurity not just within Sudan but in neighbouring countries that are struggling to absorb refugees who arrive malnourished and in need of immediate assistance.
Healthcare has essentially collapsed in conflict-affected areas. Hospitals have been directly attacked, looted, and occupied by fighting forces on multiple occasions. Medical staff have been killed or displaced. Supplies of medicines and medical equipment have been cut off by fighting and by the destruction of distribution networks. Diseases including cholera, measles, and malaria are spreading in displacement camps and conflict zones with minimal medical response capacity available to contain them.
Sudan has produced the world's largest displacement crisis. It has received a fraction of the international attention, funding, and diplomatic energy that smaller crises elsewhere have attracted.
Why Peace Talks Have Failed
Multiple rounds of peace negotiations have taken place since the war began, hosted by Saudi Arabia and the United States in Jeddah, by the African Union, by regional bodies including IGAD, and under various other multilateral formats. None has produced a sustained ceasefire. Several have produced signed documents that were immediately violated. Understanding why requires understanding what both parties are fighting for and what they believe they lose by stopping.
For SAF leadership and the political forces aligned with it, the war is an existential battle for the Sudanese state itself. The RSF, in their framing, is a militia that has parasitically grown inside the military and is now attempting to take over a country it is not entitled to govern. Accepting any outcome that leaves the RSF intact as a military and political force is, in this view, an unacceptable concession. SAF leaders also face the reality that if they stop fighting and the RSF retains control of the territory it holds, accountability for the atrocities committed in Darfur and elsewhere will become an immediate political issue.
For the RSF, the calculation is different but produces the same outcome. Hemedti has invested years in building the RSF from its origins as Janjaweed militia into a diversified political-economic-military enterprise with gold mining interests, regional alliances, and international political relationships. Accepting a political settlement that reintegrates the RSF into the SAF under SAF command, or that requires Hemedti to face accountability for past actions, is not something RSF leadership has shown any willingness to consider. The RSF believes it is winning or can win, which further reduces its incentive to negotiate seriously.
External Actors and Their Interests
Sudan's war has attracted external involvement that has complicated the path to peace without producing the decisive intervention of any single actor capable of forcing a resolution. The UAE has been documented providing support to the RSF, including weapons, equipment, and financial networks that have sustained the RSF's fighting capacity. This has been reported by UN experts and documented by investigative journalists. The UAE's motivations include its gold interests, its desire to maintain influence in the Sahel and Red Sea region, and its longstanding relationship with Hemedti that predates the current conflict.
Egypt has aligned itself with the SAF and the Sudanese government, providing military support and political backing. Egypt's calculation reflects the SAF's orientation toward the Sudanese state institutions that Egypt sees as its natural counterpart, the shared interests of professional militaries, and Egypt's concerns about the RSF's relationships with actors Egypt regards as adversaries. Saudi Arabia has tried to play a mediating role while maintaining relationships with both sides, a position that has given it convening power but limited actual leverage.
The United States and European powers have issued statements, imposed targeted sanctions on individuals, and hosted or supported peace talks. They have not used the economic leverage they hold over the UAE to pressure it to end support for the RSF. This gap between stated commitment to peace and actual policy choices reflects the competing interests that Western governments manage: the UAE is a major arms customer, a security partner, and an economic relationship that governments have been unwilling to subordinate to Sudan policy.
- El Fasher under sustained RSF siege, with mass atrocity warnings from UN.
- Khartoum remains divided, with humanitarian access severely restricted.
- Famine declared in North Darfur; acute food insecurity across multiple states.
- Chad border areas hosting over 700,000 Sudanese refugees, straining capacity.
- SAF air campaign continuing despite civilian casualty documentation.
- RSF consolidating administrative structures in areas under its control.
Where the War Is Heading
Neither side in Sudan's war is close to the military victory it has sought. The SAF has not been able to dislodge the RSF from Khartoum or from most of Darfur. The RSF has not been able to take El Fasher or to push definitively through to Port Sudan and the Red Sea. The result is a war of attrition in which the heaviest costs are being borne not by the fighting forces but by the civilians trapped between them.
Scenarios for resolution run from the bleak to the catastrophic. A negotiated settlement that leaves the country divided into SAF-controlled and RSF-controlled zones, with some form of political arrangement managing the boundary, might end the worst of the fighting but would effectively partition a country that has never successfully held together and would leave the humanitarian crisis in RSF-controlled areas without effective international response mechanisms. A SAF military victory, if it were achievable, would still require the SAF to govern a country with no functioning economy, massive displacement, and deep regional grievances. An RSF military victory would raise accountability questions that the international community would find difficult to ignore.
The most likely short-term trajectory is continuation: the fighting goes on, the humanitarian crisis deepens, international attention remains episodic, and the Sudanese people bear a cost that is already staggering and continues to grow. Sudan does not need more statements. It needs the countries with actual leverage over the parties to use it.