Somaliland Recognition: Who Moves Next, and Why?

For more than three decades, Somaliland has existed in a state of diplomatic limbo: functioning as a de facto state while remaining de jure unrecognised. With its own elections, currency, security forces, and relatively stable political order, Somaliland presents a paradox at the heart of international recognition norms. The renewed debate over who might recognise Somaliland next is less about legality than it is about shifting incentives, and in 2024 and 2025, those incentives shifted more dramatically than at any point since 1991.

The old equilibrium and why it held

Historically, the reluctance to recognise Somaliland has been driven by a fear of precedent. African and international actors have worried that recognition could encourage secessionist movements elsewhere, from Ambazonia in Cameroon to Cabinda in Angola, or further fragment already fragile states. The African Union's founding charter explicitly privileges territorial integrity inherited from colonial borders, a principle that has functioned less as law than as political convention since decolonisation. Somalia's internationally recognised federal government continues to oppose any move toward recognition, framing it as a violation of that territorial integrity.

The result has been a functional stalemate. Somaliland receives visits from foreign diplomats, operates a liaison office in several capitals, and even signs trade agreements, but always under arrangements that carefully avoid the word "recognition." This ambiguity suited most international actors. It avoided a confrontation with Mogadishu while allowing quiet engagement with Hargeisa. It appeared stable enough to leave alone.

The Ethiopia MOU changed the calculus

In January 2024, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi signed a Memorandum of Understanding that would, in its most significant clause, grant Ethiopia access to the Red Sea coast and potentially a naval base in exchange for Ethiopia formally recognising Somaliland's independence. The agreement was explosive. It triggered an immediate and furious response from Somalia, which broke off diplomatic relations with Ethiopia and sought support from Turkey, Egypt, and the Arab League. It also forced a question that had previously been theoretical: what does Somaliland recognition actually look like when a significant regional power commits to it?

Ethiopia ultimately walked back from the most provocative elements of the MOU under Somali and international pressure, and Muse Bihi Abdi lost the November 2024 presidential election to Abdirahman Irro, who has taken a more cautious line on the MOU. But the episode established something important: recognition of Somaliland is no longer merely a matter of principle. It is a tradeable political commodity with strategic value, and regional actors are now pricing it accordingly.

Gulf interests and the Red Sea competition

Geopolitical competition in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has elevated Somaliland's strategic value well beyond what the MOU debate revealed. For external powers prioritising maritime security and trade routes, particularly the UAE, which already operates the Port of Berbera through DP World and has invested significantly in Somaliland's infrastructure, engagement with Hargeisa has become more pragmatic than ideological.

The UAE has been the most significant external actor in Somaliland's economic development. DP World's Berbera port investment, which includes a free trade zone and regular cargo services, gives Abu Dhabi a concrete economic stake in Somaliland's stability. It also gives the UAE an asset that would become far more valuable, and easier to expand, if Somaliland gained formal recognition. The UAE has not recognised Somaliland, and is unlikely to be the first to do so given its broader relationships with the Somali federal government and its preference for avoiding open confrontations. But Abu Dhabi's interests are clearly aligned with Hargeisa, and this shapes the informal diplomatic environment significantly.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been more cautious, but both maintain engagement. The Gulf competition in the Horn, particularly the Qatar-UAE rivalry that played out through proxy support for different Somali factions in 2017-2019, has created a dynamic in which Somaliland functions as a node of relative stability that multiple external actors want access to, regardless of its formal status.

Who might move first, and what that would look like

If recognition advances, it is unlikely to begin with major Western powers. Smaller states with specific strategic or economic interests, or states willing to accept diplomatic costs for concrete benefits, are more likely to move first, potentially through incremental steps that fall short of full recognition but resemble it in practice.

What recognition would actually mean

A critical and often overlooked point in discussions of Somaliland recognition is that formal recognition and practical engagement exist on a spectrum. Full UN-seat recognition, the gold standard, is almost certainly decades away, if it comes at all, because it would require Security Council consensus and African Union endorsement, both of which face structural barriers. What is more plausible in the near term is a series of graduated steps: upgraded representative offices that function like embassies, bilateral agreements on trade and investment, inclusion in regional economic frameworks, and eventually formal recognition by a cluster of smaller states that creates a de facto acknowledged status even without universal acceptance.

Taiwan's path offers an instructive if imperfect parallel. Taiwan is not a UN member, is recognised formally by fewer than 20 states, and yet functions as a full participant in global trade, maintains security relationships with major powers, and operates diplomatic missions under various legal fictions. Somaliland could, in theory, achieve something similar, not because the international system would formally accommodate it, but because enough actors would find it pragmatically useful to treat it as though recognised.

The Mogadishu question

Any discussion of Somaliland recognition must grapple honestly with what it means for Somalia's federal government. Mogadishu has consistently argued that recognition would validate an illegal secession and set a dangerous precedent. Somalia has also, however, consistently failed to extend meaningful governance, economic development, or security to Somaliland in over thirty years. The international community's insistence on Somalia's territorial integrity has not produced integration, it has produced a frozen conflict that serves no one's interests particularly well.

Somalia's leverage over potential recognisers is real but declining. Mogadishu's recent security successes against Al-Shabaab have given it more credibility with international partners than it had five years ago, but its objections to Somaliland recognition carry less automatic weight as Somaliland's own governance record, multiple peaceful transfers of power, functioning courts, growing trade, makes the case for its viability increasingly difficult to deny.

The bottom line

Ultimately, Somaliland's recognition will hinge on whether continued ambiguity is seen as more destabilising than acknowledgment. The question is no longer whether Somaliland meets the criteria of statehood, it demonstrably does in most respects, but whether the international system is prepared to adapt to a reality that has persisted for over thirty years. The Ethiopia MOU, the Gulf investments, the Red Sea competition, and the broader unravelling of the post-Cold War norm framework in the Horn all suggest that the equilibrium is shifting. Recognition may not come soon or easily. But the conversation has changed, and the direction of travel is clearer than it has ever been.